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Abstract. This paper introduces the Mode and Fault Tolerance Views
approach to stepwise rigorous development of critical systems. This sup-
ports structured and recursive modelling of system fault tolerance, in-
cluding error detection, error recovery and degraded modes. The paper
offers a formal and detailed definition of the approach, proposing a way
to extend the Event-B modelling with reasoning about fault tolerance.
To support the approach, a tool which is integrated into the Rodin de-
velopment environment is employed. The method is shown by developing
a medium-scale case study from the aerospace domain; this models com-
plex mode management enriched with graceful degradation caused by
errors.
1 Introduction
This work is based on the analysis of the requirements documents and mod-
els produced by the industrial partners of the FP7 DEPLOY project1. During
this analysis we investigated the ways in which fault tolerance, fault assump-
tions, and in particular, error detection and error recovery are described and
modelled. First of all, we have found that dealing with these aspects represent
a substantial proportion of system requirements (up to 35-40%). Moreover, we
have found that the major source of faults considered in these systems is the
environment, including sensors, external networks and operators. These require-
ments typically include descriptions of degraded functionalities, the most typical
example being system safestop. More generally we observe that the requirements
include information about how the general system behaviour is affected by var-
ious abnormal situations. Unfortunately this information is rarely stated as the
priority requirement (sometimes, we had to deduce this information from other
requirements).
We have found that nearly all system requirements use the concept of oper-
ational modes to refer to different operational conditions resulting in different
functionalities provided by the system. As a result of this, system modes and
mode transitions are often intertwined with error recovery; sometimes this in-
cludes fault handling by system degradation. The same intertwining can be ob-
served in the corresponding Event-B models where one can hardly comprehend
1 ICT DEPLOY project - http://www.deploy-project.eu/
which part of the model represents the recovery activities, and which part models
the normal system operation. This and similar analysis clearly demonstrate that
for the majority of critical system developments it is crucial to have an explicit
view on the fault tolerance-related part of the system to reduce the chance of a
design fault, to improve the dependability requirement traceability and to meet
the certification needs.
It is widely accepted by the software engineering community that it is ben-
eficial to support multiple views on the model, so that each of the views can
focus on a particular concern of the model/system [2]. This facilitates system
development by explicitly bounding the modeller into a specific context without
cluttering the model (an example of this are multiple views provided by UML).
In this paper we present an approach to expressing fault tolerance (FT) views on
Event-B models and a supporting tool that mechanises the formal link between
the views and the models and provides the user with a simple environment for
editing the FT views.
2 Modelling and Refinement in Event B
The Event B framework [5] is an extension of the B Method [4]. The Event B
development starts from creating a formal system specification. The basic idea
underlying stepwise development in Event B is to design the system implemen-
tation gradually, by a number of correctness preserving steps called refinements.
A simple Event B specification (called machine) encapsulates a local state
(program variables) and provides operations on the state. The operations (called
events) can be defined as
ANY vl WHERE g THEN S END
where vl is a list of new local variables (parameters), the guard g is a state
predicate, and the action S is a statement (assignment) describing how the
system state is affected by the event. The occurrence of events represents the
observable behaviour of the system. When the conditions WHEN or WHERE
are satisfied, an event is enabled and its action can be executed. The action S
can be either a deterministic assignment to the variables or a non-deterministic
assignment from a given set or according to a given postcondition.
The INVARIANT clause of the machine contains the properties of the
system (expressed as state predicates) that should be preserved during system
execution. The data types and constants needed for specification of the system
are defined in a separate component called Context.
To check consistency of an Event B machine, we should verify two types of
properties: event feasibility and invariant preservation. Formally,
Inv(v) ∧ ge(v) ⇒ ∃v′. Poste(v, v′)
Inv(v) ∧ ge(v) ∧ Poste(v, v′) ⇒ Inv(v′)
The main development methodology of Event B is refinement – the process
of transforming an abstract specification to gradually introduce implementation
details while preserving its correctness. Refinement allows us to reduce non-
determinism present in an abstract model. The refined model can also contain
new concrete variables and events. The connection between the newly introduced
variables and the abstract variables that they replace is formally defined in
the invariant of the refined model. For a refinement step to be valid, every
possible execution of the refined machine must correspond to some execution of
the abstract machine.
To demonstrate that each event is a correct refinement of its abstract coun-
terpart, we should prove that the guard is strengthened in the refinement, and
also demonstrate a correspondence between the abstract and concrete postcon-
ditions. Formally,
Inv(v) ∧ Inv′(v, w) ∧ g′e(w) ⇒ ge(v)
Inv(v) ∧ Inv′(v, w) ∧ g′e(w) ∧ Post′e(w,w′) ⇒ ∃v′. (Poste(v, v′) ∧ Inv′(v′, w′))
where the primed expressions g′, Inv′, Post′ belong to the refined model.
The consistency of Event B models as well as correctness of refinement steps
should be formally demonstrated by discharging proof obligations. The Rodin
platform[14], a tool supporting Event B, automatically generates the required
proof obligations and attempts to automatically prove them. Sometimes it re-
quires user assistance by invoking its interactive prover. However, in general the
tool achieves high level of automation (usually over 90%) in proving.
3 FT Views
The FT Views is a modelling environment for constructing fault tolerance fea-
tures in a concise manner and formally linking them to Event-B models. It
provides fault tolerance modelling facilities explicitly supporting the traceabil-
ity of the FT/dependability requirements. The FT View is a special case of the
Mode View, developed in our previous work on modelling modal systems [7]. It is
essentially an application of the Mode View approach to fault tolerance. The FT
View approach extends the Mode View with additional fault tolerance seman-
tics, structural checks, and helps the modeller by offering reusable refinement
templates. The FT View approach was initially introduced in [13].
The new paper presents the overall approach and its evaluation. It reports
on our recent work on introducing a tool support and on approach evaluation
during development of an industrial system from the aerospace domain. This
evaluation allowed us to improve both the theoretical foundations and the tool.
A mode/FT view is a graph diagram developed alongside an Event-B model
which contains modes and transitions along with additional information neces-
sary for establishing a formal connection with the model. The tool statically
checks the views and generates a number of proof obligations for a target model.
A user is required to demonstrate the consistency between the views and the
Event-B model by discharging the obligations. We provide a brief introduction
into the Mode/FT Views which are in more detail described in [13].
3.1 Overview
The two basic concepts of the Mode View are mode and transition. Mode is
a general characterisation of a system behaviour. It describes the functionality
of a system and the operating conditions under which the system provides this
functionality. A system switches from one mode to another through a mode
transition.
The FT View adds two types of transition specialisation: an error and a
recovery transitions. Relative to the transition and its type, we differentiate the
FT types of modes: we say that an error originates in a normal mode and leads
to switching to a degraded mode or a recovery mode. The recovery transition
leads from the recovery mode back to normal. Note that mode attribution to
the specific type is relative and depends on the scope of discussion: what is a
degraded mode in respect to one mode may be a normal mode in respect to
another. In Fig. 1, mode A is a normal one; there is an error e1 leading to
alternative mode B from which the system could arrive at mode C upon an
occurrence of another error e2. B is a degraded mode relative to e1, however it
is a normal mode relative to e2.
A B C
e1 e2
Fig. 1. FT View basic concepts
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Fig. 2. Degraded and recovery modes
The building blocks of a diagram are primitives describing the initiation of
a degraded mode and a transition into a recovery mode (Fig. 2). The principle
distinction between the two is that recovery mode is obliged to terminate and
pass control back to the mode from which the initiating error originated. Safe-
stop is regarded as a special case of a degraded mode.
Diagrams are built in a step-wise manner, starting from the most primi-
tive case and introducing details using our detalisation process. The FT Views
development process is a chain of documents similar to Event-B models. FT dia-
grams are built by incrementally adding new modes, errors and recoveries using
the provided templates, and proving the refinement relationship between each
two consequent views.
In our previous work [13] we introduced the detalisation templates for FT
Views development and two general classes of fault tolerant systems that a mod-
eller should use as an initial step during the FT modelling.
3.2 Event-B Link
Mode is a characterisation of the system behaviour. To match this notion in
terms of Event-B models, modes are mapped into groups of events. A modal
view is a set of modes providing different functionality under differing operating
conditions. We use the terms assumption to denote the different operating con-
ditions and guarantee to denote the functionality ensured by the system under
the corresponding assumption. With assumption and guarantee of a mode being
predicates expressed on the same variables as an Event-B machine, we are able
to impose restrictions on the way modes and transitions are mapped into model
events and thus cross-check design decisions in either part.
Formally, a mode is characterised by a pair A/G where:
– A is an assumption - a predicate over the current system state;
– G(v, v′) is a guarantee, a relation over the current and next states of the
system; and
– vector v is the set of model variables.
A system switches from one mode into another through a mode transition
that non-deterministically updates the state of v in such a way that the assump-
tion of the source mode becomes false while the assumption of the target mode
becomes true. Transitions are also mapped into groups of events. While mode
events represent internal mode transitions which must preserve the mode as-
sumption, the transition events represent possible switches between modes that
must enable the target mode assumption. If guards of two or more events are
true at the time of transition, the usual Event-B demonic choice semantic applies
to choose which event fires.
The link with event guards and actions is ensured by generating a number
of proof obligations derived from the study on modal systems [7]. The full list is
provided on a Mode/FT Views wiki page [1].
3.3 Building diagrams
The tool support for the Mode/FT Views is a plugin [1] to the Rodin platform
providing a diagram editor, static checker, and a proof obligation (PO) generator.
The openness of the Rodin platform allowed us to seamlessly integrate our tool
into the Platform UI and the Event-B development method.
The cornerstone of the technique is an assisted construction of mode/FT di-
agrams coordinated with a chain of Event-B refinements. One starts building a
mode/FT diagram by placing modes (nodes) and linking them with transitions
(directed edges). Then a user fills the properties of modes, transitions and the
diagram as he/she progresses with modelling modes, fault tolerance, and the
associated Event-B model. The main feedback from the tool is in the form of
the consistency proof obligations. The proof obligation generator and the auto-
mated provers run in background and a user may almost immediately observe
the change in the number of discharged theorems. Analysing undischarged con-
ditions is an efficient technique in debugging a model. After some time, a user
of the Platform becomes quite adept at spotting missing hypothesis and con-
tradictory statements and mentally translating them into the concepts of the
modelled system.
The following characterisations must be provided for a mode. An assumption
is a condition that holds as long as a system stays in the mode. Any state
transition occurring in a mode must respect the mode Guarantee. The pair of an
assumption and guarantee gives rise to the consistency and Event-B model link
proof obligations. One also needs to define a list of Event-B machine Events that
are mapped into the mode. The mapping allows us to determine the mode of an
Event-B model without requiring that each model state is uniquely associated
with a mode. Finally, there is the Refines clause pointing to an abstract mode
diagram refined by the current diagram. For a transition there must be one or
more Event-B events. These events are understood to implement corresponding
mode transitions.
A mode/FT refinement relation is subject to the following conditions:
– a view refines but one abstract view;
– a mode in a refined diagram must be a refinement of an abstract mode, i.e.
no new modes may appear unlike Event-B events;
– an abstract mode must be refined by at least one concrete mode;
– new transitions may connect the modes refining the same abstract mode; in
other words, new mode transitions are previously hidden internal transitions
of abstract modes;
– transition in a refined diagram may be a refinement of an abstract transition,
i.e. the concrete source and target modes must be refinements of the abstract
source and target correspondingly
– a normal transition may be transformed into an error or recovery transition;
this cannot be undone in subsequent refinement: error and recovery transi-
tions may only be refined by compatible error and recovery transitions.
We consider a view of a fault tolerant system to be valid if it does not contain
cycles formed entirely from error transitions, and if an error eventually ends at
either a degraded or recovery mode. A mode is considered to be a recovery if
there is a path back to the normal mode that contains at least one recovery
transition. I.e., if an error leads to a mode switch, and the system can eventually
go back to the initial mode without any recovery action involved, then such
model is invalid. There should be at least one recovery action on each such
transition path.
The static checker is run upon a view file when a change in the relevant
documents is detected. It checks for mode reachability, names uniqueness, parses
and type-checks the predicates against the Event-B model, resolves references.
Below we give a short summary of the verifications conditions (proof obliga-
tions). These include both consistency condition of a mode diagram alone and
also the conditions establishing the agreement between a mode diagram and an
Event-B model. Note that these conditions constitute the (proof) semantics of
mode diagrams. More details on the meaning and purpose may be found in [7,
10, 13]. Here I are invariants, H and S are event guards and actions, A and G
are mode assumptions and guarantees, v and u are variables on abstract and
concrete levels where applicable, and primed variables depict the after-values.
– I(v)⇒ A1 ∨A2 ∨ · · · ∨An
COVER: The mode assumptions exhaust the invariant and thus cover all
the system states
– I(v) ∧A(v)⇒ ∃v′ ·G(v, v′)
FIS: Feasibility of a mode guarantee. There exists at least one internal tran-
sition that can take place within the mode
– I(v) ∧A(v) ∧G(v, v′)⇒ I(v′)
INV: Mode guarantee preserves the invariant
– I(v) ∧G(v, v′)⇒ A(v′)
PRESERVE: Internal transition condition. Mode guarantee preserves the
mode assumption
– I(v) ∧ S(v, v′)⇒ Aj(v′)
INITIALISATION: Initialisation event enables the target mode
– I(v) ∧A(v) ∧H(v) ∧ S(v, v′)⇒ G(v, v′) ∨A1(v′) ∨ ...An(v′)
EVT G: All the events of a mode must satisfy the mode guarantee. If the
same event is used non-deterministically for outgoing transitions - the as-
sumptions of new modes must also be satisfied
– I(v) ∧H(v)⇒ A1(v) ∨ · · · ∨An(v)
EVT A: The partitioning of the events into modes must be in agreement
with the event guards. A1 − An are assumptions of the modes associated
with the event
– I(v) ∧A(v)⇒ H1(v) ∨ · · · ∨Hn(v)
ENBL: Mode enabledness. At least one of the events of the mode must be
enabled when the mode assumption holds
– J(v, u) ∧A(v)⇒ A1(u) ∧ · · · ∧An(u)
REF A: Assumption detalisation condition. Assumptions of concrete modes
must be weaker than the abstract one.
– J(v, u) ∧ (G1(u, u′) ∨ · · · ∨Gn(u, u′))⇒ G(v, v′)
REF G: Guarantee detalisation condition. Guarantees of concrete modes
must be stronger than the abstract one.
4 AOCS case study
4.1 System overview
The Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) [3] is a generic component of
satellite onboard software, the main function of which is to control the attitude
and the orbit of a satellite. Due to a tendency of a satellite to change its ori-
entation because of disturbances of the environment, the attitude needs to be
continuously monitored and adjusted. An optimal attitude is required to support
the needs of payload instruments and to fulfil the mission of the satellite. For ex-
ample, attitude control may ensure that an optical system of the spacecraft will
continuously cover the required area on the ground. In general, the behaviour
of AOCS is cyclic. At each iteration the sensors provide the control algorithms
with various measurements. They are used to generate the commands to the
actuators that adjust the positioning of the spacecraft to ensure correct pointing
of the payload instrument. AOCS consists of seven physical units: four sensors,
two actuators and the payload instrument.
A satellite can be in various operational modes, largely determining its be-
haviour [3]: Off, Standby, Safe, Nominal, Preparation and Science. The satellite
is in the Safe mode from the moment separation from the launcher is achieved.
In this mode it tries to acquire and preserve a stable attitude. From Safe, satellite
progresses to modes where more sensors and actuators are involved. The overall
aim is to enter and stay in the Science mode where fine positioning is achieved
and scientific instruments are reporting readings.
The AOCS is expected to handle the mode transition errors (such as time-
outs), the control algorithm related errors (such as attitude computation errors)
and the unit errors (including all errors related to failures of redundant units,
loss of accuracy, invalid data, etc.).
4.2 AOCS Modelling
In this work we are not attempting to model the complete system although such
models can be found elsewhere [3, 11]. The goal is to investigate the applicability
of the method and the tool in the context of a realistic system. We focus on the
modal and fault tolerance aspects of the system and investigate the Mode/FT
Views modelling technique in the context of the AOCS case study. In particular,
we want to understand the benefits and possible drawbacks of the method, define
the level of abstraction at which modelling modes/FT is most fitting.
As was mentioned in section 2 the process of modelling in Event-B is based on
the stepwise refinement of the models. We start with an abstract specification
and create more detailed models proving each time their correctness and the
refinement relation. During the modelling of the AOCS we have produced 6
machines (Event-B models of behaviour) together with 5 contexts (static parts
of the models), and 6 views (Fig. 3). In the first two Event-B models M0 and M1
we define the process of system undergoing reconfiguration and trying to progress
to the Scientific mode. In M2 we add units and mode properties, we verify that
the current unit states correspond to the required mode configuration. In M3 we
model errors, unit redundancy, and verify that the units required for the mode
configuration are always available. The PLI model is an instantiation of the M3
showing the modal behaviour of a specific unit (payload instrument) in presence
of errors. M4 finalises the modelling by showing that the required scenario of the
autonomous mode switching agrees with the unit and mode management.
M0 model and its two modal views In the first model we introduce the
main aspect of the AOCS system that is the system-level mode management. To
represent the modes we define a set of constants MODES according to the six
modes described previously. We know that the autonomous scenario of the AOCS
is sequential and arrange modes into a sequence (formally a strict partial order:
antisymmetric, irreflexive and transitive). The AOCS system is always either
in a stable mode or being reconfigured. The variable currentMode ∈ MODES
defines the last stable mode, and targetMode ∈ MODES defines the target
mode of reconfiguration. If the system is in a stable mode, then currentMode =
M0
M1
M2
M3
M4
PLI
Mode0
Reconf0
Reconf1
Degraded
Mode1
Redundancy
Event-B models Mode/FT Views
Machine refinement
Mode view
detalisation/refinement
Mode/FT view association
Legend:
Model
Mode/FT view
Fig. 3. Development diagram of the AOCS modelling
targetMode. There are two events stable and reconf in the model. The first view
of the system is shown on Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. The first reconfiguration view of the AOCS system
On the first view, each mode is mapped to the event with the corresponding
name in the model. This is the simplest one-to-one mapping at this level, al-
though, generally, it is allowed to associate several events with a mode and even
have the same event linked with several modes. On the view, a mode transition
leading from a given mode is mapped to the same event as the mode. When
the system is in the mode Stable, its assumption must hold, that is the AOCS
target mode must be equal to the current mode. When the target is set to a
different mode, the system switches to the Reconfiguration mode. It stays in this
mode until the reconfiguration completes. The corresponding model events have
non-deterministic assignments - this allows us to map a single event to multiple
modes and transitions and thus be flexible with the abstract modelling.
Another view on the same model (Fig. 5) shows the partitioning of the AOCS
modes into two subsets: Safe and Science. Although the view is different it still
characterises the same model though from a new angle. The perspective of the
view is defined by the assumption and guarantee predicates. We partitioned the
set MODES into two parts - one represents the preliminary stage of the AOCS
operation (initiation of fine positioning), the other depicts the stage when the
AOCS performs the collection of scientific data using its payload instrument.
Fig. 5. The first modal view of the AOCS system
Although model is abstract, the graphical views already conveys some im-
portant properties of the system. One of the views shows two distinct phases of
the AOCS operation - with and without the payload involved. The second view
makes a distinction between the stable and reconfiguration modes. In formal
terms, there is a proof that the abstract model contains phenomena described
by the views. These phenomena would be preserved and developed during the
refinement process. In fact, even at the level of the most detailed Event-B model
we are able to observe the mode switches described by the views of the abstract
model.
The proof obligations produced at this step were discharged automatically
by the Rodin provers.
M1 model with a refined view In the first refinement step we refine the ab-
stract stable and reconfiguration events with the guards that add determinism
to the system behaviour. The abstract events could initiate the reconfiguration
(assign to targetMode) non-deterministically. In the concrete stable event we add
the guard
(newMode = currentMode) ∨ (newMode = currentMode + 1) ∨
∨ (newMode < currentMode)
where newMode is an event parameter denoting the new target mode. This guard
restricts the initiation of reconfiguration to the next advanced mode or one of
the lower modes. Hence, the system cannot directly switch from Off to Science
jumping over the Safe mode. The guard of the reconf event is extended in a
similar way. The system safe states on this level are restricted in comparison
to the abstract model where there are no invariants except the type definitions.
Such restriction is captured in the invariant
(currentMode = targetMode) ∨ (currentMode + 1 = targetMode) ∨
∨ (targetMode < currentMode)
which eliminates the reconfigurations to more than one mode ahead.
Fig. 6. The second reconfiguration view
The reconfiguration view on this model (Fig. 6) splits the Reconfiguration
mode into two: Advance and Downgrade. On the diagram we emphasize that
the Downgrade mode is a recovery activity engaged as a consequence of some
erroneous action. This is shown by the type of arrows: a bold arrow with a filled
pointer is an error transition; a bold arrow starting with a diamond is a recovery
transition. The Downgrade recovery always leads to the Stable mode and there is
no transition to the Advance mode. The diagram embodies the additional modal
properties of the system that are not easy to manually encode as Event-B safety
properties.
Both modes refer to the reconf event. Their assume/guarantee pair splits the
guard and action of the event into two parts. To formally show the consistency
with the model, there is a number of proof obligations generated. These were
discharged automatically.
One of the interesting proof obligations is demonstrating the link between
mode guarantees and event actions (EVT G) for the mode Stable. Event stable
plays dual role: it is an event of the mode and it is also an event realising
the outgoing transitions. Therefore, the event action must non-deterministically
represent all these possible state changes. One can observe that the disjunction
of the mode guarantee and both assumptions of the other two modes follow
from the conjunction of the invariant, mode assumption, event guard, and event
action that we provided above.
M2 model This model is not associated with a view. In this model we extend
the abstract mode management with the notion of unit management. We de-
clare set UNIT of constants that represent seven hardware units of the AOCS.
Constant function FUnitConf ∈ MODE × UNIT → N defines the map-
ping from modes into unit states. Also there defined are a number of axioms
for the specific configurations given by the requirements. For instance, in the
Preparation mode the payload instrument must be in the Standby unit mode:
FUnitConf(PREPARATION 7→ PLI) = PliStandby. We track the current
states of the units in the variable unitStates ∈ UNIT → N. The reconf event
is split into three concrete events. The property we verify for this model state
that our units have to be in a particular configuration when the overall system
is in a stable mode:
(currentMode = targetMode)⇒
(∀a · a ∈ UNIT ⇒ unitStates(a) = FUnitConf(currentMode 7→ a))
M3 model So far the model represented an idealised system free from adverse
environmental interference. At this level we introduce errors and unit redundancy
to mask the errors. As specified for the AOCS system, each unit has a redundant
spare which is enabled when an error in the current unit is detected. We add the
following to the model:
– set of constants ERROR = NoError, UnitError,AttitudeError to repre-
sent two possible kinds of errors, and a variable error ∈ ERROR that we
non-deterministically assign in one of events; this abstractly represents a
source of errors in the environment;
– variable units ∈ UNIT → N that gives a number of available units of a
certain kind. Our system initially has two units of each kind.
An attitude error is easily traceable in the model, the only reaction of the
system is the degradation according to the rules provided in requirements. How-
ever, the reaction of the system to the unit errors is more complex. Firstly,
the system does not change the mode if there is a spare unit available. It
disables the erroneous unit and enables the spare one. In case a failure oc-
curs in the only remaining unit, the system marks that the units of this kind
are not available and degrades to a previous (less advanced) mode in which
this kind of unit is not required. To model this, we define a constant function
FMaximumMode ∈ (UNIT → N)→ MODE which returns the maximum pos-
sible mode for the current set of available units. The events representing the
reactions of the system to the unit errors have the following in their guards:
newMode ≤ FMaximumMode(unitsC− {erroneousUnit 7→ 0})
where erroneousUnit contains the failed unit. The guard ensures that the units
required by the target mode are available. The full definition of the function
FMaximumMode results in 27 proof obligations, 20 of which were discharged
automatically. These helper axioms helped to create more comprehensible mod-
els and views. For example, this is an event of the reaction of the system to the
unit error during a stable mode:
recStable = any newMode where
currentMode = targetMode //the mode is stable
newMode ∈ MODE
newMode < currentMode //the system will downgrade
error = UnitError //a unit error is detected
units(erroneousUnit) < 2 //one or no such units left
FUnitConf(currentMode 7→ erroneousUnit) > 0
newMode ≤ FMaximumMode(unitsC− {erroneousUnit 7→ 0})
then
targetMode := newMode //initiate the reconfiguration
error := NoError //mask the error
units(erroneousUnit) := 0 //disable the unit
end
The event models the choice of a new target mode from a stable mode. The
system exhibits similar behaviour during the reconfiguration process. The prop-
erty to prove for this model is that the units necessary for the target mode are
available during both stable and reconfiguration activities:
∀a · a ∈ UNIT ∧ FUnitConf(targetMode 7→ a) > 0⇒ units(a) > 0
The property can be expressed in a more compact way thanks to the function
we have defined on mode configurations:
targetMode ≤ FMaximumMode(units)
An error in a unit may only be detected when the unit is operational:
error = UnitError ⇒
units(erroneousUnit) > 0 ∧ unitStates(erroneousUnit) > 0
A specific view on a model is one way to communicate design decision taken
in a formal model to domain experts. We build such a view to explain how the
system switches into a degraded mode. If a unit fails, the system can no longer
be in certain modes but it still does not signify a failure at the global level. We
call this a graceful degradation of the behaviour (Fig. 7).
Fig. 7. The degraded modes of the AOCS
Each mode on the diagram represents the maximum (according to the or-
dering sequence defined above) mode of the AOCS that is reachable with the
currently available set of units. Initially, satisfying its purpose, the maximum
mode is the Science mode. This is the most desirable reachable mode after the
start. After some time, both payload instruments (PLI) can fail, and the maxi-
mum mode for the system becomes the Nominal. If the steering devices fail, the
system cannot advance beyond the Safe mode. Finally, when any kind of the
tracking devices fail, the system reboots and stays in the Standby mode.
PLI unit instantiation At the third refinement step we implement an impor-
tant requirement regarding the availability of units and their redundant counter-
parts. We explicitly tell how a single unit and its spare interact. In other words,
the behaviour of a system when it detects a unit error and has to switch to its
spare. Event-B model elements relevant to such interaction are scattered all over
the model. To obtain a clean picture of this aspect of the model, we instantiate
a unit refining error handling events, and create a view on a single unit (PLI)
and its spare (Fig. 8).
Pli main off
Pli main science
Pli main standby
Pli redundant off
Pli redundant science
Pli redundant standby
main PLI error
Pli not available
redundant PLI error
Fig. 8. View on the PLI unit modes and its spare
There are three modes for a nominal PLI unit and another three for the spare
unit. The assumptions and guarantees for the six modes are of the form
unitStates(PLI) = state ∧ units(PLI) = a
where state ∈ {UnitOff, P liScience, P liStandby} corresponding to the PLI
modes, a = 2 for the main unit, and a = 1 for the redundant unit modes. A
transition to the spare unit happens upon an occurrence of a PLI error within
the main unit, and it keeps the corresponding mode for the redundant unit. On
occurrence of this error in the redundant unit, the PLI unit becomes unavail-
able (units(PLI) = 0). There are no transitions between Off modes, and no
error originates from them - this is due to the fact that no error can arise in
a non-working unit. The assumption/guarantees concern the current status and
availability of the payload. Note that the assumptions of the modes must be
consistent with the safe states defined by the model invariants. The proof obli-
gation named COVER establishes such consistency showing that the invariant
implies the disjunction of all mode assumptions. Since the assumptions cover all
possible variations of the unit status and availability, it is sufficient to use the
constant definitions and typing invariants to prove that the following holds:
(unitStates(PLI) = UnitOff ∧ units(PLI) = 2)∨
(unitStates(PLI) = PliStandby ∧ units(PLI) = 2)∨
(unitStates(PLI) = PliScience ∧ units(PLI) = 2)∨
(unitStates(PLI) = UnitOff ∧ units(PLI) = 1)∨
(unitStates(PLI) = PliStandby ∧ units(PLI) = 1)∨
(unitStates(PLI) = PliScience ∧ units(PLI) = 1) ∨ units(PLI) = 0
M4 and an autonomous reconfiguration scenario The next step is to
define specific mode transitions according to the specified AOCS sequential sce-
nario which respects the unit management rules. For this, we create a number
of constant functions:
FTransitionNewTarget ,FFdirNewTarget ,FStableAttitudeNewTarget ∈ MODE → MODE
These return the new target mode for a given current target of reconfiguration.
We distinguish three cases: an error during the advance, an error during the
downgrade, and attitude error during the stable mode accordingly. The other
cases including unit errors are already covered on the previous level by the unit
management logic. The refined events now initiate the downgrade according to
these functions derived from the requirements. For such refinement to be cor-
rect, the functions need to respect the mode and unit management rules defined
previously. In particular, there must be a correspondence between the transition
functions and the FMaximumMode function on the unit states. Such correspon-
dence is ensured by the standard Event-B GRD and SIM proof obligations which
link guards and actions of the events correspondingly on the two consequent lev-
els of abstraction.
The modal view on the system (Fig. 9) contains six modes. The assumptions
and guarantees are no more complex than they were on the first modal view:
currentMode = mode
mode ∈ {OFF, STANDBY, SAFE,NOMINAL,PREPARATION,SCIENCE}
However, the mapping to events is significantly larger because of the higher
number of events representing different functional and fault tolerance behaviour.
All transitions are mapped to the single event which changes the value of the
targetMode and switches the mode according to this view. The reconfiguration
is therefore a part of a previous mode.
Off Standby NominalSafe SciencePreparation
Back to safe
Reboot
Fig. 9. The second modal view
Overall, the modelling effort resulted in 650 proof obligations of which 550
were discharged automatically. Approximately 70% of proof obligations are con-
cerned with the modal/ft views consistency and Event-B link. Importantly, the
percentage of interactive proofs for mode-related theorems is within the bounds
of what is expected in an Event-B development. Clearly, the proportion of modal
proof obligations is high in this case study due to a deliberate attempt to em-
phasize the working of modes/ft approach.
5 Discussion and lessons learnt
The two types of models, Event-B models and FT views, are developed in parallel
and proved to be consistent with each other and with the abstract models. A
user is free to choose which of the two documents to develop first. We developed
our case study using the following steps:
– the requirements were written;
– we made sketches of the mode/FT diagrams that correspond to the require-
ments, but without formal part;
– we started a stepwise development, where we performed the following for
each model:
• each model was developed involving some inevitable but small changes
in the abstract model
• a mode/FT view was linked to the model, and the model was proved to
implement that view
• if we could not discharge some proof obligation, then changes were made
either to the model, or to the view until they became consistent
Shortly, we first create the model and then show that it implements the view.
If they are not consistent, then usually the model is the document to change since
the view is typically simpler and more comprehensible.
As can be seen from the case study, the Mode/FT Views approach costs
proofs and therefore platform performance and manual efforts. On the other
side, the explicitness, separation of concern, and potential improvement in trace-
ability can dramatically increase the development quality and improve the com-
munication between modellers and requirements engineers. A single case study
performed by developers is certainly not enough to come to a single conclusion
about long term benefits. However, even in a short term we found it worthwhile
to use such approach for modelling modal systems which come with fault tol-
erance requirements. In particular, tracing such requirements into views gives a
better understanding of the system behaviour and leaves the models uncluttered,
additional POs often point at the inconsistencies in the models which otherwise
would be difficult to cover using safety invariants.
The views are orthogonal to Event-B and each other. This gives a flexibil-
ity in choosing the ”angle” of the view on the model. Changing the assump-
tion/guarantees leads to a different view and provides with a powerful tool for
covering the behavioural aspects of the system. As we showed in the case study, a
single model can have a number of views, and each view can describe a different
aspect of a modal behaviour or FT features. It is not only beneficial but essential
to separate the views from each other. From our experiments, placing slightly
different behavioural viewpoints on a single diagram clutters the view signifi-
cantly. In particular, mixing modal descriptions with various error transitions
leads to almost a ”multiplication” of the diagram elements. On the opposite,
separation simplifies the views, and greatly reduces the PO complexity. One of
such simplified viewpoints that we produced as a result of our experiments was
dedicated to degraded modes of the system.
6 Related work
In [8] Hall shares his experience in using formal techniques in industrial projects.
In particular, he discusses the importance of using specific methods and notations
for specifying certain aspects of the systems under development. Also related to
our work are the characteristics of the specification notations Hall defines as
being the most important for users: clarity and expressiveness, these are the
properties we provide for the users of the FT Views.
Separation of concerns has been always of a high importance to the computer
science research. The recent standard on architectural descriptions [2] puts such
separation in a framework. The concern is a framework term used for the set
of properties and aspects that one of the stakeholders is interested to see in the
system. The examples of concerns are the performance, safety, fault-tolerance,
real-time – related, etc. A more specific description of the concern comprises a
viewpoint on the system and is typically supported by domain-specific tools and
notations. A view is an instance of a viewpoint within a project on a specific
(sub)system. The existence of multiple views on the problem/system gives rise to
the consistency and parallel refinement issues. A particular example of verifying
model transformations that involve multiple views is presented in [6]. The paper
presents a technique for proving the behaviour preservation of the overall model
transformation in presence of the sub-transformations on the individual views
that are not behaviour preserving. The views chosen as an example are Object-Z
as a static part with its data refinement and a CSP process view for dynamic
behaviour.
The work presented in this paper is based on our previous work on formal
specification of modal systems [7, 10] where we provided the theory of modes
and a sound link to the state-based formalisms, exemplified by Event-B. Other
related works include [12] where the concept of mode is introduced into the
component behaviour specification using the formalism of extended behaviour
protocols. The component behavioural modes are then used on the system level
to model the behaviour of the product lines. The approach supports formal spec-
ification of modes and transitions, and verification by model-checking. Another
paper on introducing modes on the architectural level [9] talks about modes as
architectural constraints over subsystem configurations. A system mode is linked
with a system subtask and is a composition of component modes. The authors
introduce the notion of modes to the Darwin architectural language and give an
example from the automotive domain.
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